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WHEN LAW AND ECONOMICS MET
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
George M. Cohen*
I.

LAW AND ECONOMICS AS FRIEND

A. A Love Story for the '90s
AW and economics and professional responsibility have in some
sense grown up together, though they have only recently seen fit
to make each other's acquaintance. Although both fields have old
antecedents, their modern versions have traveled parallel paths and
sounded similar themes. In the early 1960s, Coasel and Lucas v.
Hamm 2 startled the legal world by asserting that, under certain circumstances, legal rules do not matter: Coase by arguing that parties
will bargain around them, and Lucas by holding that lawyers can competently ignore them. Interestingly, Coase and Lucas also supportand probably should be better understood as standing for-exactly
the opposite point, that legal rules do in fact matter. Coase's concept
of transaction costs spawned a whole new vocabulary for explaining
and justifying legal rules, while Lucas's rejection of the privity rule
and recognition that lawyers owed legal duties to nonclients generated
new possibilities for regulating lawyers through legal rules. In response, the most creative subsequent efforts on both the academic and
judicial sides pursued the latter paths. These efforts peaked in the
1970s with the publication of Posner's Economic Analysis of Lawv,4
which offered the bold theory that economic analysis could explain all
of law (or, at least the common law-well, most of it), and the National Student Marketing' decision, which offered the bold proposition
that the SEC could define the contours of proper lawyer behavior

L

* Edward F. Howrey Research Professor of Law, University of Virginia.
1. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960). A few years
later, a similar theme of the irrelevancy of law was the central thesis of Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 Am. Soc.
Rev. 55 (1963), which although not written from an economic perspective, has since
been endorsed as an important law and economics work. See Readings in the Economics of Contract Law 1 (V. Goldberg ed., 1989) (reprinting an excerpt from the
Macaulay article and noting that the paper "has had a considerable influence on economic scholarship").
2. 364 P.2d 685, 689-91 (Cal. 1961) (in bank) (holding that a lawyer did not commit legal malpractice by drafting a will in such a way that a trust established under the
will was invalid under the rule against perpetuities because a lawyer of -ordinary skill
and capacity" would not have expected the rule to apply).
3. Coase has always insisted that this was his main point. See R.H. Coase, The
Firm, the Market, and the Law 28 (1988) ("Economic policy involves a choice among
alternative social institutions, and these are created by the law or are dependent on
it.").
4. Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (1st ed. 1973).
5. SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978).
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through its interpretation of the securities acts (though the court was
too timid to act on this proposition and the bar strongly resisted it6 ).
But Posner's book scarcely made mention of the regulation of lawyers
and National Student Marketing paid little attention to the economic
effects of its decision.
Not until the 1980s did law and economics develop an interest in
professional responsibility. In part, this attraction resulted from the
need for law and economics to find (increasingly scarce) virgin fields
to conquer.7 Less cynically, it resulted from the development of
agency theory8 and its application to business organization and corporate law.9 It seemed natural to extend these ideas to the organization
of rapidly growing law partnerships1" as well as to "entrepreneurial"
lawyering in class actions and derivative suits.11 On the legal profession side, the adoption of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in
1983 solidified the trend toward making ethical rules more regulatory
and coercive rather than hortatory and aspirational. 12 Further, the increased competition and accompanying laments about law as a business rather than a profession made economic explanations seem more
relevant. Still, law and economics largely stayed away from the "core"
legal rules governing lawyers. In fact, the focus was not on legal rules
at all, but on private contracting mechanisms for reducing agency
costs.
That focus has changed somewhat in the last decade, as law and
economics scholars have started to turn their attention to the legal
6. See Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. Rev.
1389, 1461-68 (1992).
7. See Symposium, The Future of Law and Economics: Looking Forward,64 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 1129 (1997).
8. See generally Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem, 51 Econometrica 7 (1983) (discussing an alternative approach to
the principal-agent problem); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of
the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin.
Econ. 305 (1976) (integrating theories of agency, property rights, and finance to develop a theory of the firm's ownership structure); Stephen A. Ross, The Economic
Theory of Agency: The Principal'sProblem, 63 Am. Econ. Rev. 134 (1973) (describing the agency relationship in economic terms).
9. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (1991) (analyzing corporate law and the effects of economic
principles).
10. See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Coming of Age in a Corporate
Law Firm: The Economics of Associate CareerPatterns,41 Stan. L. Rev. 567 (1989);
Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: An
Economic Inquiry into the Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37
Stan. L. Rev. 313 (1985).
11. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for PrivateEnforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 669 (1986); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller,
The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic
Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1991).
12. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 Yale L.J. 1239, 1241,
1249-1260 (1991).
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regulation of the key areas in legal ethics: prohibited assistance, confidentiality, and conflicts of interest. Their conclusions have ranged
from general support of the rules governing lawyers to outright hostility. The goal of this paper is to take stock of the relationship as it now
stands and-in true '90s fashion-to offer some therapeutic counseling that may help strengthen the relationship in the future. I have
three main observations. First, agency problems take multiple forms.
Second, solutions to these problems may be tradeoffs or complements;
finding complementary solutions is the key to minimizing agency
costs. Third, the legal rules governing lawyers matter a great deal in
today's environment. Paying more attention to these traits should
bond law and economics with professional responsibility for some
time to come.
B. Self-Interest. The Tie that Binds
If we are to discuss the relationship between law and economics and
professional responsibility, then the obvious place to start is self-interest, because, at first blush, the two fields take diametrically opposed
positions on the topic. For law and economics, the assumption of selfinterested behavior is the engine that drives much of the analysis. In
fact, the recognition of nonobvious self-interested responses to legal
or economic constraints is one of the key forms of "insight" that law
and economics provides (the other insight involves making analogies
by recognizing the economic similarity between seemingly different
subjects).13 On the other hand, for professional responsibility, the

working assumption has often been that ethics or professionalism requires lawyers to resist self-interest, and the relevant question has
been thought to be simply what the nature of this resistance-that is,
the content of ethical behavior-should be.1 4
On closer inspection, however, neither field is as wedded to these
basic assumptions as it purports to be. Economists have sometimes
been surprisingly slow to recognize the possibility of self-interested
behavior. For example, Coase has always complained that economists
have resisted his insight that private parties may be able to overcome
13. The extent of these insights is a matter of debate. Some have said of law and

economics, as of other intellectual innovations: "What's new isn't true, what's true
isn't new." See generally Michael Scriven, Reasoning 117 (1976) ("The crucial problem in the search for truth in this world is to combine novelty with accuracy.... The

problem is to find a statement which is both true and informative, that is, not already
known to be true.").
14. Even law and economics scholars sometimes accept this assumption about
lawyers. See Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand
Side Perspective, 49 Md. L. Rev. 869, 886-89 (1990) (arguing that law yers are less

likely than their clients to act in a self-interested way because a legal career attracts
people who are predisposed to professional values rather than profit, and because law

schools teach students that they have an obligation to pursue the public good, even at
their own expense).

276
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externality problems by bargaining around legal rules, while lawyers
have more readily embraced this concept. 15 One reason for this disparity is that transactional lawyers immediately recognized that the
kind of contracting around legal rules that Coase envisioned was exactly what they did for a living, whereas economists tended to take the
more naive view that people generally follow legal rules rather than
manipulate them. 6 But even Coase did not take the self-interest assumption as far as he could have. As many have pointed out, Coase
took a very optimistic view of bargaining behavior. 7 In fact, Oliver
Williamson extended Coase's transaction cost analysis by playing out
the implications of assuming that economic actors engage not merely
in self-interested behavior, but in "opportunistic" behavior.' This is
not to suggest that failing to carry the self-interest assumption to its
extremes is necessarily a fault of economists; to the contrary, recognizing the limits of self-interest often makes economic analysis more realistic and persuasive. 19
On the professional responsibility side, self-interested behavior has
always been an important part of the picture. First, the existence of
ethics rules and other law governing lawyers (as well as all law) presupposes the possibility of self-interested behavior. 20 After all, legal

rules are largely the fossilized remains of prior misconduct. Even if
most lawyers act ethically most of the time, the assumed few "bad
apples" (or, in economic terms, "marginal lawyers") are often moti15. See Coase, supra note 3, at 20-29 (criticizing economists for assuming too
quickly that government action is necessary to address externality problems and failing to recognize the incentives for private parties to develop their own solutions).
16. What made Coase's analysis surprising to lawyers was the subject matter to
which he applied it-nuisance law.
17. See Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. Legal Stud. 1, 15-20 (1982). Coase
remains optimistic about the possibility of cooperation. See Coase, supra note 3, at
161-62 (noting that "there is good reason to suppose that the proportion of cases in
which no agreement is reached will be small," in part because "[t]hose who find it
impossible to conclude agreements will find that they neither buy nor sell and consequently will usually have no income," and "[t]raits which lead to such an outcome
have little survival value, and we may assume (certainly I do) that normally human
beings do not possess them .... ").
18. See Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms,
Markets, Relational Contracting 47 (1985) (defining opportunism as "self-interest
seeking with guile"); id. at 49 n.7 ("[S]tandard economic models treat 'individuals as
playing a game with fixed rules which they obey. They do not buy more than they
know they can pay for, they do not embezzle funds, they do not rob banks. .. ."
(quoting Peter A. Diamond, Politicaland Economic Evaltation of Social Effects and
Externalities: Comment, in Frontiers of Quantitative Economics 29, 31 (Michael D.
Intrilligator ed., 1971))). For a general discussion of the role of the opportunism assumption in contract law, see George M. Cohen, The Negligence-Opportunism Tradeoff in Contract Law, 20 Hofstra L. Rev. 941, 953-961 (1992).
19. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, The Limits of Organization 23, 26 (1974) (discussing the importance of trust, ethics, and morality to the economic system).
20. Cf Grant Gilmore, The Ages of American Law 111 (1977) ("In Heaven there
will be no law, and the lion will lie down with the lamb ....

In Hell there will be

nothing but law, and due process will be meticulously observed.").
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vated by self-interest, especially when the wrongs they commit are for
financial gain. And to the extent that professional responsibility
serves a regulatory function, it has always been interested in how the
self-interested lawyer acts. We do not deem criminal law or contract
law uninteresting simply
because most people are law-abiding or
2
honor their contracts. '

Second, self-interested behavior may be consistent (or at least not
inconsistent) with ethical behavior. The more this is true, the less important the question of "ethical" behavior, defined in contrast to selfinterested behavior, becomes. Take, for example, the following ethi-

cal "rule": "A lawyer's representation of a client.., does not constitute an endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or moral
views or activities."' This rule seems to assume that lawyers are not
self-interested because self-interested lawyers would generally prefer
more business to less (assuming that controversial clients have the
ability to pay).' At least to an economist, it seems odd that an ethical
rule would be necessary to encourage lawyers to act in their self-interest.2 4 Thus, even if the goal of professional responsibility is aspira21. The point is somewhat less true for contract law, the academic study of which
has a strand dating back at least to Macaulay, supra note 1, and continuing today with
the "norms" literature that finds the content of legal rules less important than other
forces. It is this "school" to which Gilmore referred, at least in part, in the title of his
famous book, and whose penchant for "descriptive" analysis he summarily dismissed
as itself "uninteresting." See Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract 3 (1974).
22. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.2(b) (1995). As stated, Model
Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.2(b) is not really a "rule" at all, but merely a
declaration. It could be understood to mean that a lawyer may represent clients with
whose views he disagrees; however, unlike other ethics rules formulated as -may"
rules-such as Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rules 1.2(c), 15(c), 1.6(b),
1.13(c), and 1.16(b)-it is hard to imagine an alternative universe in which the lawyer
would be prohibited from representing such clients. Alternatively, the rule could be
interpreted to mean that a lawyer should represent clients holding unpopular views or
pursuing unpopular causes. This is the reading suggested by the comment. See id.
Rule 1.2(d) cmt. [3]. Such a reading would make the rule an aspirational one similar
to Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 6.1 (pro bono service).
23. One could argue that it might be in a lawyer's self-interest to turn down a
controversial client because the representation would upset other clients and potential clients, causing the lawyer to lose business. That argument assumes that clients
are not self-interested, that is, they choose lawyers based on whom the lawyers represent rather than the quality of the lawyer's work. Moreover, the argument ignores the
possibility that some clients might find it admirable that a lawyer would represent
unpopular people because, for example, it demonstrates the lawyer's independence.
Even if some lawyers would lose business by representing an unpopular client, it is
possible that, consistent with Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.5(a)(2), a
lawyer could charge a premium for representing an unpopular client if such representation were likely to hurt his business. But if the market for lawyers were competitive, it would be unlikely that it would be necessary for unpopular clients to pay such
a premium, because they would probably be able to find a lawyer to represent them at
market rates.
24. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.2(b) might be understood as a
kind of anti-boycott rule in that the fear is not that individual lawyers would reject
unpopular clients, but that the bar as a group would do so. Such an act might present
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tional, it is useful to identify those situations in which self-interest and
ethics are most likely to pull in opposite directions and, where the pull
of self-interest is strongest, to know when ethical behavior is likely to
be most crucial and most difficult.
Third, lawyer self-interest is not the only type of self-interest relevant for professional responsibility. Clients also may or may not be
self-interested and their self-interest may or may not take an extreme
form. For example, Justice Holmes's "bad man" theory of law2 5 has
sometimes been thought applicable to lawyering z6 If the implication
of the theory is that the lawyer should (must? may? does?) view the
client as a "bad man," that is, as a self-interested person, then the
question is, how bad and under what circumstances? The lawyer may
presume that the more "bad" the client, the less the lawyer can lawfully do on his behalf. 27 On the other hand, in some situations,
the
28
"bad man" may more likely be the lawyer than the client.
In addition, people with whom clients deal (including other lawyers
and government actors) may or may not act in a self-interested way
toward those clients. Certainly one of the lawyer's primary-and perhaps most satisfying-roles in both transactional and litigation work is
to protect one's client against the (perhaps imagined) self-interested
behavior of others. In economic terms, lawyers often advise their clients that they must protect themselves against a "prisoner's dilemma"
in which altruistic behavior by the client could lead to disastrous results if the other side behaves in a self-interested way. 29 But what
exactly is a lawyer professionally obligated or permitted to presume
about the self-interestedness of others?3" Again, the answers are
highly relevant to the nature and extent of ethical conflicts.
antitrust problems. See FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 43036 (1990) (holding a boycott by court-appointed lawyers for higher wages illegal per
se).
25. O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 459-60 (1897).
26. See William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: ProceduralJustice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. Rev. 29, 52-59.
27. One could argue, for example, that self-interested clients should be presumed
in large commercial litigation, where the mere fact that the parties have failed to
resolve their differences through private negotiation might be thought to say something about the parties' tendencies toward self-interested behavior. Similarly, one
could argue that self-interested clients should be presumed in the criminal defense
context where the stakes for the client are particularly high.
28. Class actions come to mind as one example. See Susan P. Koniak & George M.
Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 Va. L. Rev. 1051, 1102-15 (1996).
29. See generally Charles J. Goetz, Law and Economics 8-17 (1984) (discussing the
"prisoner's dilemma"); see also id. at 32-34 (describing a business school course on
negotiations in which one of the main lessons is for students to understand that "they
may be lied to").
30. With respect to what lawyers and others may presume about opposing counsel,
see, for example, SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 712-13
(D.D.C. 1978) (holding a lawyer for one party in merger who trusted the other party's
lawyer's assurances concerning a "comfort letter" had aided and abetted his client in
violating federal securities laws by allowing the merger to proceed even though the
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The point is that self-interested behavior or its absence should not
casually be assumed, but should be justified. Economic analysis, of
course, offers a justification, although somewhat circular perhaps because it is itself based on an assumption of self-interested behavior.
We should expect to see more self-interested behavior (and less ethical behavior) as the cost of engaging in self-interested behavior decreases or the benefit from such behavior increases. Economic theory
can thus help identify the conditions, behavioral patterns, and structures that increase the incentives and opportunities for self-interested
behavior.
There are good reasons to think that there has been an increase in
self-interested behavior by lawyers, clients, and those with whom clients interact. The key fact is that there has been an increase in competition in the market for legal services, as well as in the markets in
which many lawyers' clients operate. 1 The law governing lawyers and
clients has also undergone significant change. As a result, this may be
a propitious period to study the implications of self-interested behavior for rules governing lawyers.

II.

TAKING AGENCY COS-S SERIOUSLY

The economic theory of agency costs has been expounded and applied extensively in the context of lawyering. My goal in this part is to
summarize and critique this model from within the economic framework. The three main critiques of the model are that it: (1) ignores
the importance of multiple agency problems; (2) pays insufficient attention to the extent to which proposed solutions to agency problems
complement or conflict wvith each other; and (3) underemphasizes the
importance of legal rules given its assumptions.
A. All in the Family of Agency Problems
By now, the basic agency theory is well-known. In all principalagent relationships, there is a divergence of interests because of the
separation of ownership (in the principal) and control (in the agent) of
productive assets. Because the agent does not reap the full reward
from his efforts on the principal's behalf, and because the agent knows
more than the principal about what the agent is doing (what economists refer to as "asymmetric information"), the agent has the incentive and opportunity to act-whether alone or in concert with
others-in numerous ways that harm the principal's interests. The
comfort letter raised questions about the propriety of the deal), and Greycas, Inc. t:
Proud, 826 F.2d 1560, 1562 (7th Cir. 1987) (suggesting that concealing a family tie to
one's lawyer might support a charge of fraud by an opposing party who had relied on

the lawyer's professional opinion on the loan in dispute).
31. Gilson, supra note 14, at 899-903 (attributing decrease in -professionalism" to
increased monitoring of lawyers by corporate clients using in-house counsel, which in

turn resulted from higher legal fees stemming from increased corporate litigation).
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principal must therefore find ways to control these agency costs. The
primary means of control are monitoring, which involves frequent
checking up on the agent, and bonding, which involves less frequent
checking but large penalties for discovered misbehavior. The many
variations on these control mechanisms are usually differentiated by
whether the parties themselves, private "third" parties, or government
actors are doing the checking and/or the penalizing.
Law and economics scholars have used agency theory to analyze the
client-lawyer relationship. Examples of lawyer conduct that have
been traced to agency cost problems include misusing client confidential information for the lawyer's personal gain,3" favoring one client's
interests over another's,33 and increasing or skewing the demand for
legal services in ways that benefit the lawyer but not the client.3 4

Some scholars have argued that not only do lawyers face the same
agency cost temptations that all other agents do, but that these cost
temptations are even greater for lawyers. The reasons they have suggested for this phenomenon are that lawyers' specialized expertise
makes their recommendations about what legal services the client
needs and how well those services are provided particularly difficult to
monitor and evaluate, even after the legal services have been rendered, 35 and that the misuse of information is harder for clients to
police than the misuse of physical assets entrusted to an agent's care. 6
In my view, these assessments do not quite get it right, because lawyers are no different from other professionals in their possession of
specialized knowledge that is hard to monitor and evaluate.3 7 I do

agree, however, that lawyers are different from these other professionals in a crucial respect that increases the agency cost temptations
for them. 38 Lawyers, because of their knowledge of the legal system,
32. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Under the Restatement of the Law
Governing Lawyers, 19 J. Corp. L. 1 (1993).
33. See Richard A. Epstein, The Legal Regulation of Lawyers' Conflicts of Interest,
60 Fordham L. Rev. 579, 580-81 (1992); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, An
Economic Analysis of Conflict of Interest Regulation, 82 Iowa L. Rev. 965 (1997).
34. For a general catalogue of the ways lawyers can do this, see Donald C.
Langevoort & Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the Results: The Role of Lawyers in
Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 375 (1997); Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Agency Costs and Law Firm Structure, 84 Va. L. Rev. (forthcoming 1998).
35. See Gilson, supra note 14, at 892; see also Ribstein, supra note 34 (manuscript
at 6, on file with author) (focusing on lawyers' ability to influence clients' demand for
legal services).
36. See Epstein, supra note 33, at 581.
37. Arrow was one of the first economists to emphasize these features of professionalism. See Arrow, supra note 19, at 36-37 (focusing on the doctor-patient relationship); cf. Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 5-6, 1921, 25-26, 32-33 (1998) (stressing the similarity between lawyers and other professionals to argue that the greater protection of confidentiality for lawyers is unwarranted).
I believe Fischel errs by failing to recognize that lawyers are unique in certain ways.
38. The Restatement (Second) of Agency apparently agrees, because it has several
provisions that apply specially to lawyers (at least if the comments are taken seriously). See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 390 cmt. e (1958) (explaining that law-
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have unique opportunities to do harm to their clients through manipulating the licensed violence of that system. 39 That is not to say that
lawyers necessarily can do more harm than others, but rather that the
nature of the harm is unique and relevant for addressing the agency
cost problems that lawyers face.
Lawyers' unique ability to do harm is more often recognized in conjunction with a second type of agency cost problem: lawyers colluding
with their clients against others. Interestingly, this problem is not typically recognized as an agency problem in the law and economics literature,40 perhaps because the economic theory of agency does not
focus on it.4 This omission is odd because in agency law the problem
of principals and agents acting in concert to harm others is widely recognized as an "agency problem"; in fact, if collusion is understood
broadly, then this problem arguably includes vicarious liability and
contractual authority, the subjects at the very heart of agency law.
The problem also plays a prominent role in the law governing lawyers,
but is often understood in a limited way, referring to aiding and abetting client wrongdoing42 or to merely assisting clients to engage in lawful, though socially undesirable, conduct. This limited understanding
of the problem of lawyer-client harm to others-what economists refer to as the "gatekeeping" problem 43 -may also help explain why the
problem is not typically viewed as one of "agency costs."
Suppose, however, we consider the legal rules that prohibit lawyer
wrongdoing in the assistance of a client's goals, not simply lawyer
assistance in the client's wrongdoing." For example, lawyers may not
"knowingly

... make

a false statement of material fact or law to a

yer owes fiduciary duty before employment to deal fairly with client in arranging
terms of employment); id. § 396 cmt. I (discussing a conflict of interest); see also
United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 863 (2d Cir. 1964) ("In our complex society
the accountant's certificate and the lawyer's opinion can be instruments for inflicting
pecuniary loss more potent than the chisel or the crowbar."); Spilker v. Hankin, 188
F.2d 35,40 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (holding that a lawyer suing his client for a fee could not
use claim preclusion to defend against the client's challenge to the validity of the fee
contract).
39. The classic statement of the legal system as one of licensed violence is made in
Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 Yale Li. 1601 (1986).
40. See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 34 (manuscript at 3 n.2, on file with author)
(distinguishing "agency cost reduction" from "lawyers' ability to harm society on behalf of their clients").
41. The reason that the economic theory does not focus on these problems is that
its main focus is agency problems within corporations, where the idea of management
colluding with the abstract principal, the corporation, may be less obvious. In any
case, economists are beginning to address these problems. See Jean Tirole, Hierarchies
and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations,2 1. L Econ. & Org.
181 (1986).
42. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rules 1.2(d), 3.4(a)-(b) (1995).
43. See Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. Econ. & Org. 53 (1986).
44. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rules 3.1-3.5, 4.14A.
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third person."4 5 What is the economic justification for this prohibition? It seems obvious that if there were no such prohibition, then
clients would be able to use lawyers to evade the rule that they may
not knowingly make a false statement of material fact to others, a
legal rule that is socially justified, due among other things to the fact
that without it people would make wasteful investments in fraudulent
activity. The prohibition on client fraud would be rendered completely ineffective, and worse, costs would be even higher than if client
fraud were simply permitted. This is because clients would be hiring
lawyers to do their lying for them, as well as to protect them against
the lies of other lawyers. Similar reasoning explains the prohibitions
on lawyers' obstructing access to evidence,4 6 falsifying evidence,4 7 and
bribing a judge or juror or witness,4 8 all of which are variations on the
general rule of agency law that a principal can not use an agent to do
things that the principal could not lawfully do on his own.4 9
What do these rules have to do with agency costs and collusion?
Just as lawyers may act in a self-interested way to use their informational advantage to evade their responsibilities to their clients, they
may also act in a self-interested way to use this advantage to help their
clients evade their responsibilities toward others. The assumptions of
self-interested behavior by the agent, along with the difficulty of monitoring this behavior are the same in both cases, at least at this level of
generality; thus, the label "agency costs" comfortably fits both situations.5 0 Moreover, when two people combine to pursue an illegitimate act that would be more costly for one to do alone, it is a form of
collusion. On this view, lawyer wrongdoing to assist a client and a
lawyer assisting a client's wrongdoing are variations on the same
theme. The difficulties in both situations arise from the fact that lawyers are occasionally legitimately permitted-even privileged-to
"collude" with their clients to hurt third parties. But these difficulties
present questions of enforcement and categorization that arise in
other areas of law. For example, the law does not generally view com45. Id. Rule 4.1(a). The rule applies generally to agents. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 348 (1958).
46. See Commonwealth v. Stenhach, 514 A.2d 114, 119 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986);
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.4(a).
47. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.4(b).
48. See id. Rules 3.5(a), 3.4(b).
49. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 217(b)(ii). The ethics rules themselves
contain such a rule with respect to lawyers acting as principals. See Model Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 8.4(a).
50. Another way to see the connection between the lawyer's obligation to his client and the lawyer's obligations to third parties is to view the third parties' interests as
essentially the client's ex ante interests when behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance. See
Gilson, supra note 14, at 875-76; see also John Rawls, Political Liberalism 305 (1996)
(describing the "veil of ignorance"). This nifty rhetorical move transforms all lawyerclient collusion problems into traditional agency problems with an idealized "Rawlsian" client (though if one were to actually try to explain this notion to a real client
rather than an academic, the Golden Rule would serve just fine).
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petition as a tort because, like legal advice, we generally believe that
competition promotes social welfare despite the fact that it hurts some
people. But we distinguish "competition on the merits" from blowing
up a competitor's plant, and joint ventures from price fixing
agreements.-"
Aside from the problems of lawyers acting against their clients' interests and lawyers colluding with their clients against the interests of
third parties, there is a third type of "agency problem" that plays a
lesser role in professional responsibility and agency law generally, but
deserves a brief mention-if only because it is so often ignored. This
problem is the collusion of clients and third parties against the lawyer.
Although the lawyer generally enjoys an informational advantage
over clients and third parties, the lawyer may, in certain circumstances, find himself at a contractual disadvantage. The client and
third party (and usually the third party's lawyer), after having received
the benefit of the (client's) lawyer's advice, may try to cut the (cli-

ent's) lawyer out of the deal. Two seemingly unrelated ethics rules
address this problem,
at least indirectly.5 2 The first is the so-called
"no contact" rule.53 Although this rule is ostensibly directed at protecting a client from being taken advantage of by another client's lawyer, it also protects the absent lawyer from being cut out without his
knowledge.5 4 The other relevant rule is the prohibition of restrictions

on the lawyer's right to practice as part of a settlement. 55 The pur-

51. Cf.Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal
Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J. Econ. Literature 1067, 1083-84 (1989) (defining
nuisance litigation action as one that both sides recognize as having no merit and the
expected damage reward is zero).
52. For a discussion of a similar agency problem in the settlement of a class action
suit conditioned on a waiver of statutorily authorized attorney fees for the class lawyers, see Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 742-43 (1986) (holding that a district court had
the discretion to approve such a settlement).
53. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 4.2 ("In representing a client, a
lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a party the
lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer
has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so.").
54. Of course, lawyers who contact the client of another lawyer for the purpose of
undermining that client's relationship with his lawyer also run the risk of committing
the tort of intentional interference with contractual relations, or aiding and abetting
their own clients' commission of the tort. See generally Phoebe Carter, Annotation,
Liability in Tort for Interference with Attorney-Client Relationship, 90 A.LR.4th 621
(1991) (discussing third party liability for tortious interference with attorney-client
relationships). But this tort may be difficult to prove. Thus, like the ethics rules on
conflicts of interest, Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 4.2 may serve a prophylactic purpose consistent with the tort law goals.
55. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.6(b) (stating that a lawyer
shall not participate in offering or making "an agreement in which a restriction on the
lawyer's right to practice is part of the settlement of a controversy between private
parties").
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ported purpose of this heavily criticized rule 56 is to make legal services

available to more people. 7 But another possible purpose for the rule
is to prevent the client and the third party from opportunistically taking advantage of the lawyer by depriving the lawyer of one of the
ordinary benefits of representation-future business-at a time when
the lawyer might be in a vulnerable bargaining position. 8
We have not yet exhausted the potential agency problems that exist
in legal representation. Agency problems may be compounded by the
fact that clients, their lawyers, and third parties may all have agency
problems within themselves. The paradigmatic example of agency
costs within the client is, of course, the corporate client,5 9 which faces

agency costs from not only the managers, whose self-interest gave rise
60
to agency theory in the first place, but also from in-house counsel.
The problem, however, is broader than that; it includes problems such
as: clients who are agents themselves, as with fiduciaries; 6' clients

who are represented by agents, as in class actions or unions; or clients
who have contractual relationships with insurance companies under
which the insurance company provides the lawyer.6" The paradigmatic agency problem "within the lawyer" is the law firm in which the
lawyer practices. Lawyers are agents of their firms as well as of their
clients, and difficulty of monitoring poses problems in the lawyer-firm
relationship similar to those in the lawyer-client relationship.63 But
again, the problem is broader, for it includes inter-lawyer relationships
as well as intra-lawyer (that is, intra-firm) relationships. 6'
56. See, e.g., Stephen Gillers, A Rule Without a Reason: Let the Market, Not the
Bar, Regulate Settlements that Restrict Practice,A.B.A. J., Oct. 1993, at 118, 118 (criticizing Model Rule of Professional Conduct Rule 5.6(b)).
57. This rationale, which the rule shares with its neighbor rule prohibiting restrictive covenants, Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.6(a), explains the otherwise bizarre placement of Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.6(b) in a
group of rules dealing with "Law Firms and Associations."
58. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.6(b) thus operates as a limitation
on the general requirement in Rule 1.2(a) that a lawyer "shall abide by a client's
decision whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter."
59. See generally Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.13 (discussing the
lawyer-client relationship when the client is an organization).
60. For an optimistic view of in-house counsel, see Gilson, supra note 14, at 913-15
(suggesting that in-house counsel might serve as the new gatekeepers). For a more
pessimistic view, see Langevoort & Rasmussen, supra note 34, at 402 (arguing that inhouse lawyers may act in self-interested ways to maximize the volume of their work
and size of their staffs).
61. See generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Triangular Lawyer Relationships: An
Exploratory Analysis, 1 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 15 (1987) (examining special ethical situations involving legal duties distributed between lawyer and third parties).
62. See Charles Silver & Kent Syverud, The ProfessionalResponsibilities of Insurance Defense Lawyers, 45 Duke L. J. 255 (1995).
63. For an argument that these agency problems support imposing discipline on
law firms rather than on only individual lawyers, see Ted Schneyer, ProfessionalDiscipline for Law Firms?, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1991).
64. Ethics rules dealing with intra-lawyer agency problems are numerous. See, e.g.,
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 cmt. [8] (discussing lawyer disclosure
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These multiple agency problems are mainstays of professional responsibility. If law and economics is to seriously engage professional
responsibility, then its practitioners must recognize that they are buying into not simply one relationship, but a whole family. This fact has
important practical consequences for economic analysis. First, multiple agency problems complicate matters tremendously. Instead of just
a concern with lawyers' acting against their clients' interests, lawyers
acting with clients against the interests of third parties, and clients acting with third parties against lawyers, each of these possible agency
problems can exist in one of the subsidiary relationships. For example, lawyers may collude with another corporate agent against the corporate client's interest,65 collude with a corporate client against a
corporate agent's interests, 66 or become victimized by a corporate client colluding with its agents against the lawyer.67 Similarly, a lawyer
may collude with aligned lawyers against a client, 6s collude with the
client against these aligned lawyers, 69 or become victimized by the client colluding with the aligned lawyers.70 Second, the interaction
among these agency problems may be complex; in particular, attempts
to mitigate one agency problem may simultaneously exacerbate anof confidential information to other lawyers in firm is impliedly authorized); id. Rule
1.10 (discussing imputed disqualification); id. Rules 5.1-5.3, 5.6(a) (discussing responsibilities within a firm or association). Ethical rules dealing with inter-lawyer agency
problems are also numerous. See, e.g., id. Rule 1.5(e) (discussing fee splitting restriction); id.Rule 1.8(I) (discussing conflicts rule for related lawyers); id. Rule 1.9(b)
(discussing conflicts rule on when lawyer taints new firm with old firm's conflict); id.
Rule 1.17 (discussing sale of law practice). Model Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 5.4, which prohibits certain lawyer combinations with non-lawyers, is also motivated by a concern that lawyers would be tempted to collude with others against the
client's interests.
65. See, e.g., In re American Continental Corp./Lincoln Say. and Loan Sec. Litig.,
794 F. Supp. 1424, 1453 (D. Ariz. 1992) (holding that "where a law firm believes the
management of a corporate client is committing serious regulatory violations, the firm
has an obligation to actively discuss the violative conduct, urge cessation of the activity, and withdraw from representation where the firm's legal services may contribute
to the continuation of such conduct").
66. This concern is the justification for the so-called "Miranda warning" contained
in Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.13(d).
67. See, eg., Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104 (I1. 1991) (rejecting a claim of
reliatory discharge by in-house counsel).
68. For example, one of the justifications for Model Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 1.5(e)'s restriction on fee splitting is that fee splitting arrangements could lead to
collusion between the referring lawyer and an inferior referee who could not get business on his own and bribes the referring lawyer to send business his way. See Gilson,
supra note 14, at 896.
69. See, e.g., Meehan v. Shaughnessy, 535 N.E.2d by 1255 (Mass. 1989) (noting
that lawyers breached fiduciary duties to their partners by soliciting clients before
leaving to start their own firm).
70. See, eg., In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 790 (11. 1988) (suspending a lawyer for one
year for failing to report the ethical violation of his client's former lawyer, partially on
the ground that the successor lawyer drafted a settlement agreement under which the
successor lawyer and the client were to receive money in return for the client's promising not to prosecute or seek discipline against his former lawyer).
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other. Economic analysis can play a useful role in helping to develop
a sense of judgment about which problems are most significant in any
given situation.
B.

Solutions to Agency Problems: Complements of the Firm

There is no perfect solution to the agency problems described
above. All solutions are costly and none completely eliminates all
agency problems. The approach of law and economics is to try to
identify those solutions that yield the greatest reduction in agency
problems at the lowest cost. 71 One way to do this is to compare the
effects various solutions might be expected to have on the agency
problems discussed above. In doing so, it is useful to distinguish between solutions that create tradeoffs among agency problems and solutions that act as complements by mitigating more than one problem
simultaneously.
The notion of tradeoffs is ubiquitous in economic analysis. In a
world of scarce resources, having more of some resources usually entails having less of others. On the other hand, in law generally and in
professional responsibility specifically, some theorists prefer to think
in absolute rather than relative terms, especially where they believe
"rights" or "principles" are at stake. Law, like life, is more flexible
and less internally consistent than these theorists would prefer. "Balancing" and "reasonableness" are found everywhere. Thus, law and
economics has enjoyed great success in "explaining" law by articulating the tradeoffs that exist in different areas, lying in wait to ensnare
those who dare attempt to impose a foolish consistency.
In professional responsibility, the most commonly discussed tension
is that between the duty the lawyer owes to the client and the duty the
lawyer owes to others. Using the economics of agency discussed
above, we can recast this tension as a tradeoff between solutions to
the lawyer-client agency problem and the lawyer-client collusion problem. Consider the bonding solution to the lawyer-client agency problem, in which some of the lawyer's assets are put at risk of forfeiture in
the event that the lawyer acts against the client's interests. The more
successful the bonding, and thus the lower the risk of the lawyer-client
agency problem arising, the greater the risk that the lawyer-client collusion problem will occur. As a result, the law governing lawyers has
always included not only bonding rules, but antibonding rules, better
known as rules attempting to promote the lawyer's "independence"
from the client. 72 Independence helps solve the lawyer-client collu71. See Macey & Miller, supra note 33, at 970.
72. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.2(b) (1995) (allowing independence from client's views or activities); id. Rule 1.5(d) (prohibiting contingent fees
in criminal or domestic relations cases); id. Rule 1.8(e) (prohibiting a lawyer from
providing financial assistance in litigation); id. Rule 1.80) (prohibiting a lawyer from
acquiring a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation);
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sion problem, but at the expense of exacerbating the lawyer-client
agency problem. In general, there is no unique solution to this tradeoff; rather, in evaluating rules one must examine the particular context
to see whether it is more important to guard against the lawyer-client
agency problem or the lawyer-client collusion problem.
When law and economics met professional responsibility, however,
it purported to find a way out of the tradeoff. The trick was to find an
institution that simultaneously reduced the risk of the lawyer-client
agency problem and the risk of the lawyer-client collusion problem;
that is, the solution to one problem must complement rather than exacerbate the solution to the other. The institution economists have
identified is the large law firm. 7 3 The theory is that the law firm pro-

tects clients against the lawyer-client agency problem by posting a
bond in the form of its reputation for client service and then monitoring the conduct of its member lawyers to prevent forfeiture of the
reputational bond. At the same time, the firm protects third parties
from lawyer-client collusion by developing client-specific human capital, which makes it costly for the client to switch firms. This lock-in
effect gives the law firm sufficient bargaining power to thwart any attempt by the client to wrongfully impose costs on third parties. In the
language of antitrust, the legal services offered by law firms present a
tying arrangement: if clients want the benefits of monitoring against
lawyer-client agency problems, they must accept the tied product of
anti-collusion measures. 74
Though the possibility of a complementary solution, such as the law
firm, is quite tempting, it is important to understand the conditions
necessary for such a solution to work. If too many celestial bodies
must align, then the Age of Aquarius may never arrive, or may be too
fleeting to achieve the prophesied results.75 As a preliminary matter,
it is important to note that the law firm solution is procedural rather
than substantive; it represents a choice about which institution should
resolve the tradeoff rather than identifying how the tradeoff should be
resolved. And although the firm solution is common in economics, in
the sense that single ownership "eliminates" the problem of conflictid. Rule 2.1 (requiring independent professional judgment): id. Rule 3A(e) (anti-

vouching rule); id Rule 3.7 (restricting a likely witness from serving as an advocate at
trial). By the same token, other rules restrict the ability of lawyers to bond with third
parties to protect clients from lawyers colluding against their interests. See id. Rule

1.5(e) (restricting fee splitting); id. Rule 1.8(f) (restricting non-clients from financing
representation); id. Rule 5.4 (placing restrictions on non-lawyers combining with lawyers in business).
73. See Ribstein, supra note 34 (manuscript at 14-23, on file with author).
74. Cf. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461-62

(1992) (defining "tying" arrangements for antitrust purposes); Richard Craswell, Tying Requirements in Competitive Markets: The ConsunerProtectionIssues, 62 B.U. L

Rev. 661, 663 (1982) (analyzing the benefits of tying arrangements to buyers and
sellers).
75. See Aquarius, on Hair: Original Soundtrack Recording (RCA Records 1979).
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ing resource uses by internalizing the problem within the firm, in this
context the law firm is not playing that role. Thus, the law firm solution depends crucially on how much we really believe the firm can
successfully navigate the lawyer-client agency problem and the lawyer-client collusion problem simultaneously. Let us consider the two
problems in turn.
The key to the firm as a solution to the lawyer-client agency problem is the effectiveness of the reputational bond. There is no doubt
that reputation matters to some degree. Business clients, like most
customers, rely on brand name as a proxy for quality that is difficult to
assess directly.7 6 But there are limits to reputation." For example,
for reputational bonding to work, lawyer-client agency problems must
be accurately identified and widely publicized, and the reputational
bond of potential future business must be large enough that the harm
to the law firm's reputational asset from misconduct is commensurate
with the social harm the misconduct causes. 8 One would expect,
however, that the same information asymmetry that created the lawyer-client agency problems in the first place also makes reputation difficult for clients or the public to assess. 79 Moreover, law firms may be
particularly adept at manipulating evidence of agency problems so as
to often be able to evade or minimize reputational penalties. As for
the information law firms cannot control, it may misrepresent or exaggerate agency problems. In the jargon of law and economics, there
will be overinclusion and underinclusion problems in the "enforcement" of the reputational bond.
There are several ways to improve the effectiveness of the reputational bond provided by law firms. One way is to increase the size of
the bond by increasing the size of the firm.8" To the extent that large
size puts the firm more at risk, the firm may face something akin to a
76. The classic statement of this argument is made in Benjamin Klein & Keith B.
Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. Pol.
Econ. 615 (1981).
77. As Oliver Williamson explains:
Reputation effects will deter defection from the letter and the spirit of an
agreement in the degree to which (1) defections can be made public knowledge, (2) the consequences of defection can be fully ascertained .. ., and (3)
parties who experience or observe defection penalize the offender and/or his
successors in "full measure."
Williamson, supra note 18, at 395-96; see also id. at 406-07 (listing other reasons why
reputational bonding might not be effective); Gillian K. Hadfield, ProblematicRelations: Franchisingand the Law of Incomplete Contracts, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 927, 978
n.232 (1990) (discussing limits of reputational effects in franchising).
78. According to Professor Ribstein, "Specific misconduct will diminish the value
of the lawyer's reputation in an amount that varies according to the public's perception of the seriousness of the conduct." Ribstein, supra note 34 (manuscript at 15, on
file with author) (emphasis added). The question is how accurate the public's perception is.
79. See Langevoort & Rasmussen, supra note 34, at 410.
80. See Ribstein, supra note 34 (manuscript at 17-19, on file with author).
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private punitive damage regime. But law firm size does not guarantee
a larger or more effective reputational bond; in fact, size may cut in
the opposite direction. 8 1 Size increases the cost of monitoring-that
is, agency problems-within the firm. ' Relatedly, size makes it difficult for a firm to establish and maintain an ethical "culture" of informal norms rather than formal monitoring and regulation. Size also
may make it easier for the firm to explain away misconduct as an aberration and blame it on individual wrongdoers rather than the firm
itself, thus reducing the reputational penalty the firm suffers.'s On the
other hand, if large size is effective at increasing the reputational
bond, then the bond may create overdeterrence and client opportunism problems well-recognized in punitive damage regimes.
A second way to improve the effectiveness of reputational bonding
is to supplement it with additional monitoring to improve the accuracy
of the reputational information. 4 That is precisely what many clients
have done through the use of in-house counsel. But while in-house
counsel may improve client monitoring, it is not clear whether inhouse counsel from different companies coordinate their knowledge
to the extent necessary to significantly improve the effectiveness of
reputational bonding. Moreover, the ability of in-house counsel to
monitor outside lawyers is itself limited by the competence and experience of in-house counsel as well as their own self-interest.'s
Even if the reputational bonding mechanism successfully minimizes
lawyer-client agency problems, there nevertheless remains the question of whether the firm simultaneously minimizes lawyer-client collusion problems. A key to the firm's success in this arena is bargaining
power, which results from the specific knowledge the firm develops
about a client's needs and the firm's quality. But, as Professor Gilson
has argued, once clients become concerned enough about lawyer-cient agency problems to increase their monitoring of law firms, the law
firm loses the bargaining advantage necessary to resist lawyer-client
81. Professor Ribstein's contrary view, that size conquers all, reminds me of
Boxer, the horse, whose response to every problem was "I will work harder." But

that response, although often admirable, is not always best, as Boxer discovers too
late to avoid his demise. See George Orwell, Animal Farm (1945).
82. Professor Ribstein disagrees. He argues: "But to the extent that a firm's
reputational bond is an increasing function of size, large size may make economic
sense even if it increases shirking and monitoring costs." Ribstein, supra note 34

(manuscript at 20, on file with author) (emphasis added). Although it is certainly
possible that increasing size could reduce agency costs more than it increases them
(and likely true when comparing small firms as a group with large firms as a group), it
seems highly unlikely that this relationship invariably holds true.
83. The idea that organizations with large reputational capital may be better able

to weather misconduct is captured by the phrase "living off one's reputation."
84. Professor Williamson cites the Japanese car supplier associations and labor
unions as two economic institutions that serve to improve the accuracy of reputational

information. See Williamson, supra note 18, at 121 & n.1l (discussing supplier associations); id. at 261 (discussing unions).
85. See Langevoort & Rasmussen, supra note 34, at 401-02.
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collusion.8 6 Even if bargaining power exists, however, it may not be
sufficient to ensure that lawyer-client collusion does not occur. In the
first place, the law firm might use the lock-in effect to harm the client
rather than to prevent the client from wrongfully harming others. On
the other hand, if the law firm decides that the benefit from pleasing
the client exceeds the costs it will suffer by colluding with the client
against third parties, then the law firm will not be able to resist lawyer-client collusion. Indeed, the very reputational bond that enables
the law firm to combat lawyer-client agency problems could be
strengthened by a firm's willingness to collude against third parties.
This tendency would be exacerbated by agency problems within the
client which, interestingly, could result in the complementary solution
completely flipping, so that the law firm would wind up engaging or
acquiescing in conduct that hurts both the client and third parties
simultaneously.87
My point is not to disparage law firms or the possibility of complementary solutions, but to suggest that more may be involved in developing such solutions than law and economics scholars have thus far
recognized.88 We now have the makings of a theme. Law and economics has much to offer professional responsibility, from playing out
the implications of self-interest to identifying agency problems to recognizing tradeoffs and the potential for complementary solutions. But
law and economics also has much to learn, both about when to press
the analysis farther than it has done and when to pull back. Relationships are complicated things.
C. Beyond the Shadow of the Rules
Law and economics must pay more attention to the role that legal
rules governing lawyers can play in developing solutions to agency
problems.89 In the discussion above, I have provided some examples
of how ethics rules and other law governing lawyers attempt to ad86. See Gilson, supra note 14, at 899-903.
87. See Williamson, supra note 18, at 138 (noting that although "reputation effects
can deter managers from behaving irresponsibly," they are imperfect because "[slome
managers may shrug them off if the immediate gains are large enough and if they
cannot be required to disgorge their ill-gotten gains").
88. Professor Gilson is quite pessimistic on whether law firms can recapture the
gatekeeper role he postulates they might have played, although he tentatively suggests that in-house counsel might be able to provide the complementary solution. See
Gilson, supra note 14, at 913-15. As he recognizes, however, there are "very real
barriers" to in-house counsel successfully serving as gatekeepers. Id. at 915. For example, in-house counsel are far more strongly bonded to their clients and, perhaps
more importantly, to the agents of those clients, than most law firms are, making their
ability to resist lawyer-client collusion difficult.
89. My focus here is on the choice between legal and nonlegal solutions to agency
problems, not on the choice among legal institutions for regulating lawyers. On that
question, see David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 Harv. L. Rev.
799 (1992).
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dress various agency problems, either directly (through prohibition or
punishment of conduct resulting from agency problems) or indirectly
(through prohibition of activities that facilitate agency problems). In
this section, I suggest two related ways in which legal rules can serve
as complementary solutions to agency problems.
First, ethics rules and the law governing lawyers can play the same
role as the one discussed in the prior section of this Article relating to
law firms. The reason is that the rules define the qualifications for
membership in the profession and the scope of acceptable conduct
within the profession; in turn, the profession acts, in some sense, as a
mega-firm.9" Thus, there are rules designed to protect against both
lawyer-client agency problems and lawyer-client collusion problems.
More important, however, is that the rules are tied together through
regulatory bundling. Thus, clients are legally protected from lawyerclient agency problems, but in return, they must submit to regulation
of lawyer-client collusion problems. The market power of the legal
profession as a whole allows this tying-or regulatory bundling-to
occur because clients will have a difficult time finding a substitute for
legal services. This account provides a parallel to Professor Gilson's
explanation for the decline in "professionalism": as clients find more
ways to substitute away from legal services, it becomes more difficult
for regulatory bundling to work.
In some sense, this notion is not new at all. Professional responsibility has long recognized the quid pro quo of a limited monopoly for
the legal profession in return for an undertaking of various social obligations. What is new in this account is the recognition that there is an
inextricable link between the rules intended to solve very different
problems, along with a clearer understanding of how that link works.
To ignore this link is to miss an important aspect of the regulatory
structure of the legal profession.
A second role for legal rules is to complement or facilitate nonlegal
solutions to agency problems. Law and economics scholars, in their
zest to find private solutions to agency problems, sometimes overlook
this role for legal rules, and even find the legal regime hostile to these
solutions. For example, legal regulation may enhance reputational effects by publicizing misconduct and providing more accurate information about it than would otherwise exist. In addition to reputational
bonding, economists sometimes suggest certification as another pri90. The profession and the firm do not exhaust all the possible options. There are
numerous subgroups within the profession that serve similar functions, such as the
American Bar Association, the Association of Trial Lawyers Assurance, the American College of Trial Lawyers, and the American Law Institute. These organizations
all provide a type of professional bonding. In addition, as I have recently written,
legal malpractice insurers such as the Attorneys' Liability Assurance Society, through
their loss prevention programs, also play a similar role. See George M. Cohen, Legal
Malpractice Insurance and Loss Prevention: A Comparative Analysis of Economic
Institutions, 4 Conn. Ins. LJ. 305 (1997).
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vate mechanism for overcoming the lawyer-client collusion problem.
Legal rules facilitate lawyer certification of client positions in both litigation 91 and transaction' settings. Further, the growth of malpractice
liability has given rise to increase loss prevention activity by malpractice insurers.93

We have thus come full circle from where we began. Legal rules
matter. They are the protector of last resort against the excessive pursuit of self-interest. They tie solutions directed at various agency
problems together in ways that may reduce tradeoffs. And they are
often complementary to nonlegal solutions. Taking agency problems
seriously means taking the law governing lawyers seriously.
III.

SOME RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

Thus far, I have tried to trace and develop the relationship between
law and economics and professional responsibility. In this part, I
briefly play out some of the themes in a few specific areas that have
received recent attention from law and economics scholars.
A.

Confidentiality, Legal Advice, and ProhibitedAssistance

The duty of confidentiality, along with the related attorney-client
privilege and work product doctrine, has received a surprisingly cold
reception from law and economics scholars.94 I say surprising because
the classic rationale for these doctrines-that they are necessary to
encourage clients to seek out legal advice so that they will comply
with the law-has a definitive law and economics flavor to it. Law
and economics often focuses on how legal rules affect incentives ex
ante rather than how parties behave ex post. Yet Professor Fischel
has recently argued that the confidentiality doctrines should be abolished because they benefit lawyers while harming clients and society
as a whole. 95 Although Fischel argues that the legal profession has
91. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.
92. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 2.3 (1995) (permitting attorneys to conduct evaluations at the client's direction but for the primary benefit of
third parties).
93. See Cohen, supra note 90.
94. See Fischel, supra note 37, at 9-33; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Legal Advice A bout Information to Present in Litigation: Its Effects and Social Desirability, 102
Harv. L. Rev. 565, 605-611 (1989) (discussing the debate over the social value of confidentiality rules in litigation); Steven Shavell, Legal Advice About Contemplated
Acts: The Decision to Obtain Advice, Its Social Desirability,and Protection of Confidentiality, 17 J. Legal Stud. 123, 123-24 (1988) (questioning the social value of confidentiality rules if legal sanctions are not set optimally). But see Ronald J. Allen et al.,
A Positive Theory of the Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine, 19
J. Legal Stud. 359, 360 (1990) (arguing that the attorney-client privilege and the work
product doctrine increase the amount of information available to clients).
95. Fischel states: "Confidentiality rules ... benefit lawyers but are of dubious
value to clients and society as a whole. Absent some more compelling justification for
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conned us into accepting these perverse rules, it may be he who has
been unwittingly seduced by the bar's "P.R."
In the first place, confidentiality rules are an essential part of agency
relationships (and agency law) 96 generally because in the absence of
such rules, the informational advantage the agent has would enable
the agent to use information about the principal to the principal's disadvantage. Applied to the lawyer-client context, the fundamental
purpose of confidentiality rules is to help minimize lawyer-client
agency costs. Although this point is obvious, it is surprising how often
it is neglected in professional responsibility discussions of the duty of
confidentiality. Instead, these discussions often focus only on client
incentives, rather than lawyer incentives, and they seem to view lawyers as neutral, altruistic, or victims of client manipulation.97
This focus on client incentives partly results from the tendency to
lump the duty of confidentiality with the attorney-client privilege,
which does seem to be more directed to client incentives.9 s But even

the attorney-client privilege implicates lawyer-client agency problems.
Absent the privilege, lawyers' informational advantage over their clients would be magnified: lawyers would be in a much better position
than their clients to assess and control the increased legal risks to clients associated with the possibility of lawyer testimony. 9 Although
clients would be more reluctant to hire lawyers in the first place, for
those who did, this informational asymmetry would give self-interested lawyers a greater ability and incentive to manipulate the creation and presentation of evidence to promote their own interests at
the expense of their clients' interests. 10 Thus, the loyal lawyer astheir existence than has been advanced to date, these doctrines should be abolished."
Fischel, supra note 37, at 33.

96. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 395 (1958). In agency law, the duty of
confidentiality is considered part of the duty of loyalty agents owe to principals. In
professional responsibility, the duty of confidentiality is often distinguished from the
duty of loyalty.
97. The ethics rules, for example, take this approach to justifying the general duty
of confidentiality stated in Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6. See Model
Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 cmt. [21-[4]; id. pmbl. [7]; id. Scope [201. The
lawyer-client agency problem aspect of confidentiality is relegated to the conflict of
interest rules, see id Rules 1.8(b), 1.9(c), in contrast to the agency law rule, Restatement (Second) of Agency § 395, which lumps the use and disclosure of confidential
information together.
98. See Allen et al., supra note 94, at 362-74 (stating that the attorney-client privilege encourages clients to present to lawyers negative information that may nevertheless not be legally detrimental to clients).
99. Recall the discussion above about what makes lawyers unique agents. In the
agency cost theory, the attorney-client privilege is another example of a rule in part
designed to protect clients from the unique harm lawyers can do to them. See supra
Part H.
100. Fischel suggests that lawyers would respond to the absence of the attorneyclient privilege by investigating less, reducing the number of lawyers working on a
case, and avoiding written memoranda and interview notes, all of which would reduce
the value of legal services to clients and so the demand for those services. Fischel,
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sumed in most discussions of the attorney-client privilege may be in
part a result of the privilege, which helps bond lawyer interest to client
interest.
Lawyers may have an interest in characterizing the confidentiality
problem as one of client incentives for seeking legal advice rather than
lawyer incentives for disloyalty, but law and economics is supposed to
be sensitive to self-interested behavior that other approaches overlook. The duty of confidentiality is about lawyer self-interest; in fact,
the duty of confidentiality presupposes lawyer self-interest. Fischel
not only ignores this rationale for the duty of confidentiality,1 "1 but he
also turns it on its head by arguing that lawyer self-interest has perpet-

uated and expanded the rule.
Fischel makes the same move when he discusses the self-defense
exception to the ethics rule on confidentiality.102 He joins others who
have criticized this exception as reflecting rather than responding to
lawyer self-interest. But the self-defense exception fits within agency
theory. Absent the self-defense exception, self-interested lawyers
would be more reluctant to represent clients who, as Fischel recognizes, might attempt to use an absolute confidentiality obligation to
unfairly hold up the lawyer's fees or otherwise blackmail the lawyer. 10 3 This same rationale might also justify the application of the
self-defense exception to suits brought by third parties against lawyers, which Fischel finds unjustifiable. In fact, in one sense, the rationale for third-party suits is stronger. One way a lawyer could respond

supra note 37, at 7. Although these responses are plausible, my point is that lawyers'
responses would not be limited to those that arguably favor clients' interests. Lawyers might, for example, investigate more, put more lawyers on a case, or write more
memoranda if those actions would protect them more from the greater number of
third-party suits to which they would now be exposed, or if those actions would enable them to extract greater fees. True, these responses would decrease the demand
for lawyers even more. But, if the elimination of the attorney-client privilege itself
eliminated clients whose demand for legal services was relatively elastic, the remaining clients would have a more inelastic demand that might be ripe for lawyer exploitation, or avoidance of client exploitation.
101. This omission is quite remarkable given that Professor Fischel is one of the
preeminent exponents of agency cost theory as applied to corporate law. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 9, at 14-15 (noting the use of "agency costs" throughout
their book).
102. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(b)(2).
103. One interesting question raised by the self-interest rationale for the self-defense exception is whether it makes self-interested behavior by lawyers a self-fulfilling
prophecy. The exception applies only to lawyers who are threatened with certain
kinds of harm, largely economic. But lawyers whose morals are compromised by client behavior are not provided a disclosure option by the ethics rules, though the rules
do allow counseling, see id. Rule 2.1, and withdrawal, see id. Rule 1.16(b)(3), while
making vague references to other possibilities. See id. pmbl. [6]; id. Scope [14]. To the
extent that these approaches are weaker than the explicit disclosure option, the profession may discourage altruistic people, relative to self-interested people, from becoming lawyers. That does not necessarily mean a morality self-defense rule would be
a good thing. Such a defense might be too hard to enforce and too vulnerable to selfserving justifications by lawyers.
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to the absence of a self-defense exception would be to exercise more
caution in choosing clients. That strategy, however, would not help
lawyers avoid third-party suits. Another argument Fischel makes in
criticizing the self-defense exception is that lawyers could use it to
blackmail the client, that is, to "threaten to reveal the information if a
client refuses to pay a disputed bill or threatens to expose malpractice."'" Although that is possible, under the current legal regime (in
contrast to Fischel's "no duty of confidentiality" regime) it is unethical,10 5 not to mention possibly illegal or tortious. The risk to the lawyer is asymmetric with the risk to the client for blackmailing the
lawyer in a world with confidentiality rules but no self-defense exception, because in that world the lawyer would be handcuffed from proving the blackmail, whereas the client in the existing regime is able to
report or sue the lawyer.
The best criticism of the self-defense exception, which Professor Fischel suggests, is that it is hypocritical because lawyers are more interested in protecting themselves from client abuse than in protecting
third parties from client abuse. That brings us to the lawyer-client
collusion problem, which, of course, is the biggest problem with confidentiality rules generally. The agency theory discussed above suggests
that the duty of confidentiality should not be interpreted so as to facilitate lawyer-client collusion; thus, the duty cannot be absolute. Moreover, lawyer self-interest means that the absence of lawyer-client
collusion cannot merely be assumed, but must be actively secured.
Yet traditional discussions of lawyer confidentiality often simply assume that lawyers will (altruistically) counsel their clients not to engage in wrongful behavior 1 6 and that the "ethical moment" occurs
when the client says no. In fact, the problem arises when the lawyer
sees signals of client misconduct and chooses to ignore those10signals
7
rather than act on them. That is the beginning of complicity.
104. Fischel, supra note 37, at 11.
105. The exception in Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(b)(2) is lim-

ited to information the lawyer "reasonably believes necessary" to reveal. Moreover,
the threat itself would be prohibited by Rule 1.8(b) because it is not permitted by
Rule 1.6.

106. See, e.g., Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 cmt. [1), [3] ("One of
the lawyer's functions is to advise clients so that they avoid any violation of the law in

the proper exercise of their rights .... Based upon experience, lawyers know that
almost all clients follow the advice given, and the law is upheld."). The problem is

that confidentiality rules themselves do not provide an incentive for lawyers to give
such advice. Other ethics rules recognize that the lawyer in fact might not want to
give advice that the client does not want to hear and so require such advice to be

given. See i. Rules 1.2(e), 1.2 cmt. [6], 2.1, 2.1 cmt. [5]. Again, however,it is interesting that the agency problems with confidentiality are not discussed or referred to in
the confidentiality rule and the accompanying comments.
107. See, eg., United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 862 (2d Cir. 1964) (holding
that a lawyer can be held to have committed criminal fraud if he "deliberately closed

his eyes to facts he had a duty to see.., or recklessly stated as facts things of which he
was ignorant" (citations omitted)).
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It is also consistent with the self-interest story. The very lawyer selfinterest that makes the protection of confidentiality necessary also
makes the abuse of confidentiality possible. Confidentiality rules hinder lawyers' ability to use clients' information against them. But by
enabling lawyers to get more information about clients, the confidentiality rules give lawyers a leg up on future business. Future business
depends on how successful the client is, which, in turn, depends on
how many risks the client is willing to take. If clients bear the downside legal risks while lawyers do not, then the lawyers have an incentive to advise or permit clients to take "aggressive" legal positions,
which at some point may spill over into criminal or fraudulent acts. If
the risky action succeeds, then the lawyer is rewarded; if it fails, then
the lawyer does not expect to suffer. 108
The law of lawyering, as discussed above, recognizes the lawyerclient collusion problem by limiting the confidentiality rules. Lawyer
liability to third parties, such as aiding and abetting liability or negligent misrepresentation, is one way of bonding lawyers to their advice
(or lack thereof). The crime-fraud exceptions to the attorney-client
privilege and the work product doctrine make legal sanctions against
client wrongdoing more effective, and so deter lawyers from engaging
in the collusive strategy. How effective these limitations are and how
far they should extend are matters of great debate, though it is apparent from the legal wreckage that makes up professional responsibility
cases that lawyers too often underestimate the import of these limitations. For my purposes, however, three observations will suffice.
First, the confidentiality rules and the limits to those rules represent
a good example of the regulatory bundling discussed above. Although
clients benefit from confidentiality rules, and the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine give lawyers market advantages over
other groups, these benefits come at a price, namely, the limitations
designed to thwart lawyer-client collusion. 10 9 You have to take the
108. Langevoort and Rasmussen worry that transactional lawyers too often overstate legal risks to get more fees. See Langevoort & Rasmussen, supra note 34, at 377.
Tb the extent that future business is more important than current fees, they may have
it exactly backward, depending on how strongly the rules against lawyer-client collusion are enforced. Transactional lawyers' bias is more likely to be in favor of legal
advice that permits client activity. If that activity turns out to be legally problematic,
lawyers typically argue either that the client was unfairly singled out (in the underenforcement world) or that the client's activity was socially desirable and the law
should not be interpreted rigidly to prohibit it (in the overenforcement world). Lawyers have more incentive to overstate legal risks in one-shot transactions, such as real
estate closings, wills, divorces, and other consumer transactions.
109. Confidentiality rules also may encourage private complementary solutions. In
particular, confidentiality rules may encourage greater investigation because clients
have less reason to fear that lawyers will use information they discover to their clients'
disadvantage. But investigation is a classic tying arrangement: at the time the investigation is conducted, the lawyer does not know whether the information found will be
good or bad. Critics of confidentiality rules seem to assume that it is easy for lawyers
to suppress bad information, but at least in civil litigation, this is not so given liberal
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bad with the good. For this to work, however, the "good" has to be
good enough for clients and lawyers to buy into the system. Thus, the
criticism that confidentiality rules benefit lawyers is insufficient.
Second, the limits to confidentiality that try to combat lawyer-client
collusion are sensitive to economic considerations of when such collusion is likely to occur. For example, many of the recent developments
of the law governing lawyers that limits confidentiality have occurred
in the context of client insolvency, most notably the savings and loan
crisis. Although these developments are often criticized as simply
searching for deep pocket defendants, there is an economic explanation. Just as the law of vicarious liability deters principals from reducing their liability bills by hiring insolvent agents, so, too, does the law
of lawyering deter lawyers from leeching onto potentially insolvent
clients who may be underdeterred by legal sanctions, which inefficiently inflicts costs on third parties. Moreover, the insolvency context is more conducive to the complex client problem of managing
agents acting against the entity's best interests.
Third, though Fischel recognizes the lawyer-client collusion problem associated with confidentiality rules, he falls into the trap of
thinking that the rules do not matter. He makes no reference in his
article to the crime-fraud exception 1 0 or the law governing lawyer liability to third parties or even clients."' Rather, he focuses on the selfinterested behavior of the bar in attempting to resist liability for lawyers through confidentiality rules.' 12 This story is surely an important
one, and the criticism of the bar is well-taken," 3 but as an argument
against the existing legal regime, it is grossly incomplete.
discovery rules. In transactional work, negative information limits the actions lawyers
may take on behalf of clients. In both cases, ex ante investigation facilitates ex post
policing.

110. See, eg., Fischel, supra note 37, at 8 (discussing the use of the attorney-client
privilege and the work product doctrine to shield negative results from product tests

without mentioning the crime-fraud exception); id. at 9 (noting that confidentiality
rules "create powerful obstacles to the discovery of attorney participation in an unlawful scheme" without citing to the crime-fraud exception or lawyer liability); id. at
30 (noting that "legal advice can itself decrease the probability that the proposed
conduct will be sanctionable by providing clients with advice on how to minimize the

probability of detection" without noting limits on such advice).
111. Fischel refers to the "noisy withdrawal" comment in Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 and criticizes it as enabling lawyers to "protect themselves"

from liability without making any "provision ... for the return of fees." Id. at 15.
Although this may indeed be the bar's intent behind Rule 1.6, the ethics rules do not
provide immunity from liability.
112. See id at 12-15. Interestingly, one of the three cases Fischel cites is Barker v.
Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1986), in which Judge

Easterbrook declined to impose liability against lawyers under the securities laws because the ethics rules did not impose a duty to disclose. Again it is ironic that Judge

Easterbrook, Professor Fischel's co-author and fellow exponent of agency theory, ignores the agency problems created by so strongly deferring to the bar's vision.
113. The story is well-told, and the criticism effectively made by Susan Koniak. See
Koniak, supra note 6.
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Conflicts of Interest

Conflicts of interest rules provide a useful comparison to confidentiality rules, both in the treatment they receive from professional responsibility and from law and economics. First, unlike professional
responsibility's justification for confidentiality, which seems almost to
assume lawyer altruism, the justifications for conflicts rules seem to
assume extreme lawyer self-interest. The ethics rules and the law of
disqualification do not simply create a duty not to act for an adverse
party without the client's consent, which is the agency law rule, 14 but
instead forbid representation entirely, which in law and economics
jargon is known as a property rule. 1 15 In addition, the rules governing
vicarious disqualification, that is, extending the conflict beyond the
lawyer to the firm, also establish strict presumptions which assume
that lawyers will find it difficult to resist economic temptation. Moreover, unlike confidentiality rules, conflicts rules have largely received
a supportive reception from law and economics scholars, who have
justified the harshness of these 16rules as necessary to combat the
agency problems discussed here.
Even in the conflict of interest context, however, law and economics
scholars sometimes downplay agency problems. Although generally
supportive of the existing conflicts regime, Macey and Miller argue for
two reforms. First, lawyers should be allowed to pay clients for the
right to engage in conflicting representations." 7 Second, client consent to conflicts should always be allowed to cure the conflict."' With
respect to lawyer payment to clients, Macey and Miller apparently
have in mind situations in which the conflict is likely to impose significant costs on the client to be paid; if the costs to the client are trivial,
the client might very well consent without explicit payment. But the
situations in which bargaining might make sense are also the situations in which the agency problems are likely to be the greatest. Lawyers have an informational advantage in knowing both how much one
client is going to be hurt by divulging information and how much the
other is going to be helped. Why the client would be willing to trust
the lawyer's assessment of these values is not clear.1 19 The same infor114. See Restatment (Second) of Agency §§ 389, 391 (1958).
115. See Macey & Miller, supra note 33, at 979-93.
116. See Epstein, supra note 33, at 582 (noting difficulty in proving breach of confidentiality); Macey & Miller, supra note 33, at 968-70 (arguing that simply punishing
disclosure as opposed to prohibiting representation is not sufficient to address
problems of reduced vigor in representation and enforcement). But see Ribstein,
supra note 34 (manuscript at 23-48, on file with author) (arguing that current conflicts
rules can increase agency costs).
117. See Macey & Miller, supra note 33, at 1003.
118. See id. at 1004.
119. The role the lawyer plays is important. Generally, lawyers are not hired to
market their clients' information. See Epstein, supra note 33, at 583 ("The strong separation of legal functions from investment functions is thus understood as part of the
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mational asymmetry helps explain why the waiver rules do not automatically credit client consent. In some sense, the rules-by
restricting waiver-are trying to ensure meaningful or fully informed
consent.
Law and economics scholars have also paid insufficient attention to
the way the conflict of interest rules and the law of disqualification
serve as effective bonding devices. Consider the rules concerning
joint representation in a transactional setting. If the relationship between the parties comes unglued, then the lawyer is thereafter generally prohibited from representing either in the same transaction.' 2
This rule bonds the lawyer to his judgment regaring the potential for
conflict. The lawyer pays a large penalty if conflict in fact occurs. This
gives the lawyer an incentive to evaluate carefully ex ante the potential for conflict in joint representation and to avoid biasing this judgment by factoring in the possibility of future work arising out of the
subsequent turmoil. A similar justification applies to the general rule
that in a successive representation a lawyer may not attack his prior
work. Allowing lawyers to do so would weaken the lawyer's bond to
his prior work and provide too great an incentive for the lawyer to
intentionally or accidentally leave loopholes to preserve the possibility
of future work.
CONCLUSION:

COURTSHIP OR FRIGATE

One of the themes of the movie from which I took the title of this
essay explores is whether true friendship between men and women is
possible, or whether sex always gets in the way.' 2 ' The same may be
asked of law and economics and professional responsibility. The natural inclination of those inclined toward the philosophical side of legal
ethics might be to disparage the encroachment of law and economics
on the field and fear that its blind devotion to self-interested behavior
threatens to swallow up whatever remains of professionalism. I have
taken a different view here. I have argued that self-interested behavior is an inevitable, though not all-consuming, part of professional responsibility, that agency theory-when understood-can richly
illuminate many features of professional responsibility, that law and
economics can make an import contribution towards our developing
complementary solutions to agency problems, and that legal rules do
matter. If scholars keep these features in mind, then this may indeed
be the beginning of a beautiful friendship.

normal attorney-client relationship."). If lawyers are explicitly hired to play a brokering or mediating role, the siutation is different.
120. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 2.2(c) (1995).
121. When Harry Met Sally (Castle Rock Entertainment 1989).
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